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Abstract 
 Pandemic influenza is a global outbreak of disease that occurs when a new 
influenza A virus appears in humans, causes serious illness and then spreads easily from 
person to person worldwide. Three major influenza pandemics swept the globe in the 
20th century causing millions of deaths. With the emergence of SARS in 2003 and the 
variant avian influenza H5N1 in 2005, the federal, state and local governments have 
spent immense amounts of time, money and human resources on efforts to plan for the 
complex issues and serious impact of a new influenza pandemic. Plans developed were 
modeled on an all hazards emergency preparedness templates that were used successfully 
by those responding to natural/ or man-made chemical and fire emergencies. Until the 
spring of 2009, these plans were not effectively challenged beyond local or regional 
communicable disease outbreaks.  
 On April 23, 2009, the NC-HAN (Health Alert Network) sent a high priority 
message across the state of North Carolina indicating CDC reported 7 cases of new 
variant swine influenza A (H1N1) infection among residents of Southern California and 
Texas. All infected persons recovered. Within 24 hours, the number of new US cases 
began to escalate and more cases in Mexico associated with deaths were reported. The 
newest pandemic challenged and tested North Carolina local public health system’s 
ability to respond to a widespread communicable event. This offered an opportunity to 
examine plans and response through the review of events and reports from NC state, 
regional and local public health agencies. What was found was a reassurance that the 
framework of initial response is intact, plans are workable and partnerships to extend 
local resources are in place. Equally, there is a need to continue to improve and refine the 
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plans, processes and infrastructure to utilize these measures to prevent and contain 
disease spread and to minimize poor health outcomes in people. 
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Introduction 
After September 11, 2001 the federal government recognized the need to assist 
the local community in responding to man made emergencies specifically those biologics 
that could be weaponized. The anthrax event of October of 2001 that left 6 people dead, 
many others ill, and closed postal facilities, brought home the message of the need for a 
local public health coordinated response (Casani, 2001). Between 2003 and 2005, a series 
of natural respiratory influenza like illnesses emerged that reminded public health and 
emergency responders that diseases can have untoward consequences that require a 
strong public health infrastructure. In Asia, a new corona virus produced a contagious 
respiratory illness termed severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) that caused 
significant morbidity and mortality in Hong Kong and Canada. A variant of the H5 N1 
avian flu occurred in the poultry flocks of the northern provinces of China causing human 
illness with deaths. Within 18 months, H7N7 caused illness in the poultry flocks of 
turkeys and chickens in Norway, decimating those flocks and causing conjunctivitis 
among workers and veterinarians tending the flocks. One death resulted. These events led 
the World Health Organization to convene a congress to consider planning and response 
to influenza like illnesses.  Most of the member nations, including the US, put influenza 
pandemic planning at the top of their public health surveillance and response agenda. 
Congress created the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act in January 
2006, by amending the Public Health Services Act. This strengthened the infrastructure 
of public health and provided federal funding through the Center for Disease Control 
(CDC) to specifically address local pandemic influenza planning and response. Lessons 
learned from the historical framework of the 1918 and 1957 flu pandemics as well as the 
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more recent emerging infectious disease events of 2003 indicated there was much work 
to be done. Preparation was divided into creating a consistent language and organization 
of response through the Incident Command System, and multidiscipline local 
collaboration for planning and training was encouraged with funding to support those 
efforts. Understood was the realization that resources would be limited and capacity 
building at the federal, state and local level would be needed. Interventions such as non 
pharmaceutical responses, vaccines and antiviral distribution needed to be prioritized and 
implementation guidance developed. It was recognized that risk communication and 
public information messaging would be the key to a successful response as little could be 
done without the cooperation of the public. 
Public Health in the US 
 Public health in the United States is a system with wide variations in 
organizational structure. Responsibilities and boundaries overlap across federal, regional 
state, and local jurisdictions. Governmental, private, for profit and not for profit agencies 
or organizations may provide traditional public health functions of surveillance, disease 
prevention, health risk reduction, and assurance of access to health care. Defining public 
health can be elusive. Public health has been described as “a social enterprise that is 
inherently political in nature based on the principles of social justice that dictates fairness 
in distribution of benefits and burdens  and whose primary responsibility it is to fulfill 
society’s interest in assuring conditions in which people can be healthy” (Institute of 
Medicine [IOM], 2003).  
Public health is often portrayed as neutral, when at it’s best nothing happens - no 
epidemics, food and water are safe to consume, citizens are well informed about their 
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health risks and needs and children are immunized. In the absence of catastrophic events, 
politicians and officials managing resources are often not able to recognize the work 
needed to sustain that absence and funding for public health efforts are redistributed to 
other perceived immediate needs (Garret, 2000). Because of this, between the 1980’s and 
1990’s, every state in the US lost funding and personnel in key governmental public 
health infrastructure roles at the local and state levels as resources were redistributed to 
meet other priorities.  
The challenge to respond effectively due to the loss of public health infrastructure 
became evident with the 2001 anthrax event and emergence of biological influenza like 
epidemics of 2003. As a result, the recognition that public health was needed and should 
be responsible for pandemic preparedness and response is now recognized as part of 
“assuring conditions in which people can be healthy”.  
With the bolstering of public health capacity comes the responsibility for public 
health preparedness and planning. In his book Public Health, What it is and How it 
Works, Turnock (2004) makes the point that preparedness and response are inextricably 
linked. Preparedness is based on lessons learned from both actual and simulated response. 
Effective response is all but impossible without extensive planning and thoughtful 
preparation (p 313). After 2003, states began the process of recreating the public health 
infrastructure at the state and local level to enable effective response to influenza like 
illnesses. Determining the most efficient and effective methods to become prepared for 
and responsive to public health emergencies would challenge the infrastructure. 
Based on the requirements of the federal directives in both bioterrorism and 
pandemic influenza preparedness, states and localities began to shore up the public health 
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system to fulfill the primary role of public health. Public health is always called upon to 
identify problems that call for collective action to protect, promote and improve the 
health status of a population primarily through prevention, containment and control 
(Turnock, 2004).  Priorities for building the base of pandemic influenza planning 
included epidemiology and surveillance capacity, laboratory infrastructure, 
communication, supply and delivery of pharmaceuticals, health care needs and 
continuation of community services (Gensheimer, Meltzer, Postema, & Strikas, 2003). 
In 2003, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) began providing guidance for 
preparedness that centered on adopting standardized response nomenclature, putting 
capacity resources in place, and setting specific targets and deliverables required by the 
public health organizations receiving preparedness funding. In the guidance were clear 
recommendations to rebuild the public health infrastructure of surveillance and 
epidemiology. The 2005 Institute for Medicine (IOM) recommendations also included a 
specific call to action to rebuild and sustain public health by educating and training the 
microbial threat workforce (Smolinski, Hamburg, & Lederberg [Eds.], 2005).  
In addition, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released 
the nation’s Pandemic Influenza Plan in December 2005. This document was intended to 
be a guide for state and local planners to develop local response plans and assist local 
public health agencies in preparedness planning.  
Public Health in North Carolina 
Many states including North Carolina chose to use the federal resources to build 
effective response teams to supplement local public health efforts. North Carolina public 
health preparedness began in post 9/11/2001, when the North Carolina Division of Public 
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Health (NC DPH) was awarded seed money from the State “Rainy Day” fund for 
bioterrorism preparedness. As in other states, additional federal grant money through the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) became available allowing NC DPH 
to expand this program. In 2002, an office dedicated to public health preparedness was 
opened within the Epidemiology Section of NC DPH. This office is now known as the 
Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (NC PHP&R). The NC PH 
preparedness and response system was intended to function as a coordinated network of 
NC public health agencies, linking key resources, personnel, and capabilities across the 
state, regional, and local levels. In North Carolina, health policy and rule making are 
invested at the local level with the local Boards of Commissioners and Boards of Health. 
The NC PH preparedness system allows for the distribution of responsibility for 
preparedness and response throughout the state however, ultimately emergency response 
occurs at the local level (Brogden, L. & Easterling, D., 2009). 
Based on the directives of HHS and the CDC, all state and the local public health 
agencies will coordinate the pandemic influenza response within and between their 
jurisdictions. State and local responsibilities include: 
 Enhancing disease surveillance  
 Distributing public stocks of antiviral drugs and vaccines  
 Providing local health providers guidance on clinical management and infection 
control  
 Preventing local disease transmission using a range of containment strategies 
 Providing ongoing communication with the public  
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Current National Capacity: 
Capacity building in public health began in earnest after September 11th. 
Unprecedented federal resources for enhancing public health were made available in the 
aftermath of the respiratory illness events (Gensheimer, K. F., Meltzer, M. I., Postema, A. 
S. & Strikas, R. A. 2003). Public health systems on all levels increased the infrastructure 
necessary to carry out public health emergency response.  
 Public health at the national level is administered through US Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS is composed of many divergent health services 
and health related subdivisions. The health related agencies do include those most closely 
associated with emergency preparedness; the CDC, the National Institutes of Health, and 
the Food and Drug Administration. A review of the budget indicates that 85% of net 
operating costs for HHS is consumed by health services agencies that control Medicaid 
and Social Security functions leaving limited resources for public health functions (HHS, 
2008). Although “The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the 
government’s principal agency for protecting the health and well-being of all Americans” 
it has no direct line authority over the functioning of public health at the state or local 
level. The government’s role in public health emergency response is setting the agenda 
and policy with clear directives for outcomes that are expected and to provide resources 
to achieve those outcomes. The capacity to fulfill that role has been augmented by 
government support of homeland security issues and federal emergency response 
agencies. State, tribal and local levels cooperatively implement federal mandates and 
policies through funding agreements. 
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Across the States, public health systems and their associated capacity vary widely. 
The National Association of County & City Health Officials (NACCHO) recently 
published 2008 National Profile of Local Health Departments (LHDs). A survey across 
the 50 states was done and the results are a testament to the diversity of local public 
health systems in the United States.  There are 2,794 LHDs across the 50 states. Of those, 
64% serve populations less than 49,000 and 60% are individual county based 
departments. Health departments in twentynine states are governed primarily by local 
authorities (boards of health, local officials) including North Carolina. The remainder are 
state governed or in some shared governance of state and local authority. Sources of 
revenue supporting the local public health system includes State and local funding 45%, 
fees, Medicaid, Medicare reimbursement 28%, Federal pass through 17%, with Federal 
direct 2% and other sources 9%. In NC, only 8% of funding is from Federal pass through 
which includes funding for public health emergency preparedness. CDC funding for 
emergency preparedness came to LHDs through state health agencies in three funding 
streams: base funding, pandemic flu funding, and cities readiness initiative (CRI) 
funding. Of the LHDs surveyed, 23% received no funding for base emergency 
preparedness and even more reported not receiving funding for pandemic influenza or 
CRI. Median funding received was $45,700 and varied widely by the size of the 
population served.  
Funding for public health preparedness in North Carolina is based on local 
funding through the county tax base, State funding to assist the locality in carrying out 
core public health functions and CDC administered grant funds originating from the 
Federal government and passed through the State to the local jurisdictions. Each of those 
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funding streams is tied to expectations, deliverables and requirements set by the source. 
Preparedness activities center on those expectations. Understanding the interrelationship 
and capacity of the three levels and funding expectations is crucial in promoting an 
effective public health response system. 
The staffing profile of the NACCHO survey respondents show that 59 percent of 
all LHDs had less than one FTE supported with emergency preparedness funding, 20 
percent with one to less than two FTEs, and 22 percent with two or more FTEs. In spite 
of only 57% of LHDs surveyed reporting an emergency planner on staff, more than 80 
percent of LHDs had developed or updated a pandemic flu preparedness plan, 
participated in a tabletop drill or exercise, and/or provided emergency preparedness 
training to staff. In addition, most LHDs had selected a method for mass prophylaxis. 
Mutual aid agreements had been developed by 59 percent of LHDs overall and Medical 
Reserve Corps development was reported by 39 percent of all LHDs.  
Capacity in North Carolina: 
Early in 2009, the North Carolina Division of Public Health (NC DPH), and the 
NC Association of Local Health Directors (NCALHD) contracted to assess public health 
preparedness across the State of NC (Brogden, L. & Easterling, D., 2009). The 
assessment was designed to capture key indicators from the state, regional and local 
public health system and was intended to describe the current level of readiness and 
identify critical issues for system improvements. 
 The assessment indicated the North Carolina public health preparedness system 
builds on assets associated with North Carolina’s overall system of public health. NC 
DPH and local health departments have long histories of communicable disease response, 
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epidemiology, laboratory analysis, and environmental health investigations. Federal 
funding has allowed for new positions, additional training, upgraded technologies, and 
new systems and equipment for communications. Critical capacity expansion of the NC 
State Laboratory of Public Health (SLPH) and the development of three Regional Public 
Health Laboratories has enhanced the surveillance and identification of potential risks. 
Implementation of data systems that support automated syndromic surveillance (NC 
DETECT), emergency notification of key public health partners (NC HAN), and 
management of disease investigation data (NC EDSS) allows the state and local public 
health agencies to trend and investigate communicable disease threats. North Carolina 
has used federal funding of preparedness planning and response to increase infrastructure 
personnel, activities, and resources in the 85 local health departments in the state; 
including the creation of seven Public Health Regional Surveillance Teams (PHRSTs) 
who support the activities of the local public health agencies.  
The greatest strength of the North Carolina public health system may be the many 
dedicated professionals with extensive public health emergency experience (and the 
public health components of natural disasters) and a strong culture of working together 
that contributes to the effectiveness of the NC system. All three levels, state, regional and 
local public health representatives are united in a common understanding of 
epidemiology and surveillance, contacting and communicating with response partners. 
All three levels recognize the need to have personnel trained and knowledgeable in 
preparedness as needed capacities to fulfill the public health response role. 
Although the NC preparedness system has a number of important strengths, 
several limitations were identified by state level respondents. North Carolina is a large, 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 13 of 39 
geographically diverse state. There is tremendous variation between the 85 county and 
district health departments in the level of resources available to LHDs. Especially in 
smaller counties, limited funding and/or personnel can inhibit the local health 
department’s ability to support a full-time Preparedness Coordinator (PC) and carry out 
the range of functions associated with public health preparedness. Grant guidelines from 
CDC require each local health department to adhere to the same deliverables and contract 
requirements, even though there are considerable differences in county (or district) 
populations, vulnerability and risk, and relative wealth. This limits the flexibility of 
planning and response options in communities. Because the local public health agencies 
are governed by local authorities, the high degree of local autonomy can pose problems 
in effective preparedness and response. During an emergency, it takes longer to 
coordinate multiple agencies across the state. Additionally, numerous layers of 
administration can be a roadblock that slows down the response. The division of authority 
and competing priorities inherent in the system can also lead to conflict between 
localities and the state. Local health departments vary in terms of the degree to which the 
local Health Director, local Board of Health, and local elected officials are committed to 
preparedness.  
Challenging the system? What happened?  
The NC PHP & R described the April-May response to the emergence of novel 
H1N1 flu variant as an exercise allowing public health to test surveillance and laboratory 
systems. In April 2009, cases of infection with new variant swine influenza A (H1N1) 
were identified through routine surveillance. The cases exhibited symptoms typical of 
uncomplicated influenza infection (fever plus cough and/or sore throat) and appeared to 
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be unremarkable as influenza like illness. However, the rapid identification of the unusual 
variant of H1N1 through existing surveillance systems made it clear the surveillance 
system worked. Plans put in place to “catch” an emerging infection resulted in the US 
public health system’s ability to recognize and initiate response across the country using 
the Health Alert Network. Initial response actions to emerging novel H1N1 was case 
finding, enhanced surveillance and pre positioning resources.  
On April 26, 2009 the US government declared a public health emergency 
allowing resources to be released through the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), the 
federal government’s cache of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. The declaration 
also allowed greater access to laboratory and surveillance resources by the States. By 
April 29, 2009, the spread of novel H1N1 was felt worldwide. Consequently, the WHO 
raised the pandemic alert level to Phase 5. On a national level, the CDC began issuing 
guidance and updates for both clinicians and laymen.  
On April 24, 2009, the public health units across North Carolina were notified 
about the “novel” swine H1N1 influenza. One local health department preparedness 
coordinator mentioned the cases in the southwestern part of the US as an FYI in an Epi-
team meeting that was called to discuss a current case of Pertussis. By April 27, 2009, 
local public health departments and systems began to mobilize key staff and were 
receiving updates and guidance from NC PHP&R. Also on April 27
th
 the decision was 
made at the federal level to deploy 25% of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to the 
states’ receiving sites. These supplies were to be shipped to the jurisdiction’s local 
receiving sites.  Shipments began to arrive in Raleigh within days. The local public health 
departments initiated their pandemic influenza plans and contacted their key community 
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partners for assistance. A review of local after action reports across North Carolina 
(unpublished reports, NC PHP&R, 2009) indicates the health department systems 
responded by immediately instituting case investigations related to spread of 
H1N1(Novel) and applying isolation for mitigation as warranted and directed by NC 
DPH. As soon as clear clinical guidance was received from NC DPH, localities began 
educating staff and clinical partners on protocols for case investigation and reporting. 
They began working with community emergency management and response partners to 
provide guidance about mitigation measures, including school closures. Within 2 working 
days local public health agencies had initiated the process to receive antiviral medications 
and other medical supplies at the local receiving sites from the Strategic National 
Stockpile by working with the local law enforcement and emergency management 
personnel. By day 5, the agencies had distributed the appropriate inventory to local 
hospitals and securely stored the remainder of local supplies. A risk communication 
media message map was begun within 24 hours of the realization this was a new 
pandemic in order to provide important information related to key activities or events in 
the H1N1 response to the public. Localities also began establishing information centers 
with their local government partners.  
In North Carolina, the Public Health Coordination Center was established in 
Raleigh by NC PHP & R and daily updates provided to local health departments. The 
State Laboratory of Public Health (SLPH) began around the clock operations in an 
attempt to keep pace with all specimen submissions. Guidance in surveillance, treatment, 
protection, and prevention was issued. 
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By May 7, 2009 there were 7 confirmed novel flu cases in North Carolina and the 
SLPH had processed 496 specimens. By June 25 the number had increased to 179 
confirmed cases with 2 deaths. 
What we learned 
Locally, public health departments spent the years 2001-2009 writing emergency 
preparedness plans to address the areas of bioterrorism, pandemic influenza, natural 
disasters, and receipt and processing of the SNS. Those plans were exercised with agency 
partners in their community and agreements are now in place with those partners to 
identify agency responsibilities and processes. Use of the National Incident Management 
Systems protocols through common language and roles allowed public health to 
understand the structure of emergency management.  
A basic tenet of emergency preparedness and response is the concept of 
evaluation of all events to determine what went well, where the gaps in response occur 
and what areas can be improved (Federal Emergency Management Agency, March, 
2009).  In addition, public health must continually evaluate the impact of those health 
programs to improve outcomes. The NC PHP&R requested local public health 
Preparedness Coordinators submit after action reports for the time period of April 23, 
2009 thru May 19, 2009 in order to examine gaps and consider improvements that can be 
made. Forty-nine local public health agencies responded representing over 70 local health 
departments in North Carolina. The after action report format was a simple matrix of 
what happened, what went well, improvements needed, identification of the responsible 
parties for corrective actions and a time line to achieve the improvement. The results 
provided a look at the effectiveness of response to the pandemic H1N1 influenza event in 
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North Carolina (Appendix A, Table 1). In addition, NC PHP&R also received drill 
reports and hotwash minutes (evaluation meetings held immediately after an event) from 
several local public health agencies. 
Local public health agency reports indicated commonalities of strengths and areas 
of needed improvement in the response to novel H1N1influenza. Surveillance systems in 
place worked, enabling rapid detection of possible cases. This, in turn, allowed for 
implementation of the pandemic influenza plans. However, existing plans were based on 
the premise of a novel pandemic beginning as an avian based virus in Asia and would 
need to be slowed and contained upon reaching the US. Case finding and surveillance 
response to a virus originating more locally required a faster response with reduced 
likelihood of containment. Because the situation changed so quickly, local health care 
providers depended on the local public health agencies for clinical guidance in case 
identification, testing and treatment. Maintaining surveillance activities, managing and 
disseminating quickly changing information stressed the capabilities of the local public 
health agencies. 
Review of the reports also found infrastructure and capacity needs with concerns 
for staffing the response when balancing the needs of the daily operations. In this event, 
cases were few in North Carolina and did not necessitate the closure of services normally 
provided or reallocation of essential resources. Many localities spoke of the need for 
additional back up personnel in key positions because of fatigue or lack of available 
trained personnel needed for the role. Training for staff was also identified as a capacity 
need. Local public health agencies need epidemiology training for staff, respiratory 
protection plan updates, and overall just in time training plans for roles in event response. 
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None of the reports indicated a strong medical reserve corps volunteer base to assist with 
personnel surge capacity in the event.  
Technological capacity for communication and resource tracking was another gap 
identified in the reports. Twenty four hour hot line capacity, inventory management 
system and better radio communications between inter and intra agency partners were 
concerns for local public health agencies. Further, better use of internet capabilities for 
messaging and communication was also noted as a need. 
As indicated by the local public health agencies, the basic receipt of antiviral and 
respiratory protection supplies through the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) was 
accomplished with little complications. However, local public health agencies did 
recognize the need to improve the decision making process in deciding how to release 
those supplies to best benefit the community. Public health agencies are charged with 
determining priority health interventions and mitigation efforts such as education, mass 
vaccinations or medication delivery that will reduce the risk of future cases of disease or 
complications. Making decisions regarding distribution of resources was more difficult 
when many local public health agencies found local health care providers and emergency 
services providers did not have the necessary training in respiratory protection. 
 Training of local public health agencies staff and interagency partners in the 
overlap areas of SNS and isolation and quarantine issues was also identified as common 
issues that needed to be addressed throughout North Carolina. Training needs included 
determining use of public health measures such as school closures and other methods of 
social distancing.  
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By and large the most common theme of the reports was a need to improve 
communication in all directions from the State to the local jurisdictions including inter- 
and intra-agency partners, local public health agency staff, and the general public. 
Capacity building in risk communication, message mapping and recognizing and 
supporting the role of a trained public information officer was identified consistently 
throughout. Several local public health agencies noted a need for a clear risk 
communication plan. Local public health agencies were stretched by public and partners’ 
desire for information while from the federal and state authorities information changed 
rapidly and at times appeared to be inconsistent and incomplete.  
 Review of LHD after action reports, drill reports, and “hotwash” local health 
department team meeting minutes (unpublished reports to NC PHP&R, May 2009) 
indicates successful collaboration and cooperation among state, regional, and local public 
health participants and successful distribution of SNS assets to local public health 
agencies and other healthcare providers. The reports support the capacity of local public 
health agencies to respond resulting in the successful implementation of incident 
management procedures as defined in local health department plans. The reports reflect 
the ability of local public health agencies to coordinate and communicate situational 
status to the interagency partners, adjust to necessary changes to local receiving sites 
procedures and the ability to plan, conduct, and evaluate a regional event at multiple 
sites, using multiple communication modalities, with multiple agency representatives.  
 Most local public health agencies agree the plans in place for responding to 
pandemic influenza and use of SNS assets were effective and could be operationalized, 
but needed to be modified. Some of the adjustments were locality driven and spoke to a 
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need for alternative local receiving sites, additional equipment needs and needs to update 
contact lists and practice call down drills. Common recognized modifications to plans 
include a need to link and coordinate the two plans, SNS and Influenza Pandemic 
Response, including recognition of different triggers for response. Within the pandemic 
influenza plan, a need to provide more decision making guidance in isolation and 
quarantine and for deciding when school or public event closures should occur based on 
the local needs. Also noted was a need to rethink partner possibilities to include 
pharmacists and other non physician healthcare partners.  
 Support for plan revisions is made by the NC Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response. In a presentation to local public health agencies on 
September 24, 2009, Dr. Julie Casani stated the North Carolina pandemic influenza plans 
were based on the incorrect assumption that pandemic strain would be a shift from an 
H5N1 influenza A virus and the morbidity and mortality would be as severe as H5N1. 
The pandemic would start overseas and we would be able to slow its spread to the US. 
Much like a hurricane, the US would have time to prepare. Because of this incorrect 
assumption triggers and thresholds were based on WHO phases and ignored the other 
model intervals and triggers. In spite of the fact that North Carolina has responded 
effectively, plans need to be adjusted and updated before the next phase or pandemic. 
Recommendations  
 Prior to September 11, very few people including public health professionals 
considered the role of public health in emergency planning and response. After 9/11 the 
attitudes held toward public health by the community at large, partner agencies and 
public health practitioners and the roles the public health professionals were expected to 
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perform changed and grew more extensive. The daily mission of public health is to assure 
the conditions under which people can be healthy. The substance of public health consists 
of organized community efforts aimed at the prevention of disease and promotion of 
health. Integrating the expectation of today’s public health professionals to include 
emergency planning and response into the daily mission and essential services can 
strengthen public health and encourage a commitment to public health emergency 
response. While recognizing local autonomy in local health departments does cause 
variation in degrees of commitment to preparedness and funding for local public health 
does vary across North Carolina, local public health agencies and local boards of health 
need to embrace the concept that emergency preparedness is a core public health function 
commit the necessary resources and time to improve services and outcomes (Brogden, L. 
& Easterling, D. 2009).  
As noted previously, national indicators and local response reviews are clear that 
the need for more competent, well trained staff exists across the state and the localities. 
Preparedness and response coordination, communicable disease/ epidemiology support 
and public information coordination were vital skills needed in the response to the novel 
Influenza H1N1 event. Local public health agencies need to consider public health 
emergency response competencies such as those when reviewing job descriptions and 
making agency hiring plans. Those roles key to planning and response need to be filled 
with competent individuals as soon as feasible. It is recommended that local public health 
agencies review staffing needs of the organization in a response event and determine how 
to support those needs through volunteer pools and partnering with local healthcare 
providers or other agencies. In addition, they must consider the need to plan for key 
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personnel to be unavailable for their primary role during an event. Many local public 
health agencies have staff with response roles during an event that is different from the 
primary position they fill in ordinary operations. For example, the designated public 
information officer in a public health emergency may have the role of administrative 
assistant to the local health director during normal business. This can limit the staff 
member’s availability to perform the role of administrative assistant when needed for risk 
communication in an event that is not so large as to curtail normal services. Planning 
needs to be done to determine how both roles can be adequately met in a response event. 
A 2005 survey conducted by Balicer, Omar, Barnett and Everly in Maryland local 
health departments indicated that only about 53.8% of public health workers would report 
in an influenza pandemic event. Of those surveyed, only 38% felt they were 
knowledgeable of the public health impact and less than 30% understood their role in a 
public health emergency. Over 80% recognized the need for additional preparedness 
training and education. The issue of workforce training and competency is central to the 
success of any public health systems. Public health has an obligation to have human 
resources to respond who understand their roles and are practiced enough to be flexible in 
implementation of local plans. Public health professionals need to understand and be able 
to articulate their unique role in preparedness and response. Certainly this was found to 
be true by NC local public health agencies when evaluating their initial response to novel 
Influenza H1N1. In North Carolina, both local health directors and the regional public 
health response teams recognized the need for additional preparedness and response 
training, especially for new Preparedness Coordinators (PCs). It is recommended the 
State provide that orientation and training to new preparedness staff and that regional 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 23 of 39 
PHRSTs assist the local public health agencies to provide training to all the staff of the 
local public health agency. The local public health agency has a responsibility to make 
training a priority and to put processes in place that will assure new staff understand their 
role and that continuing staff have regular updates and drills to sharpen their skills. 
In the model Pandemic Influenza Plan (HHS, 2005), it is noted that planning is 
not to be done in a vacuum but must include all community responders and the influenza 
plans must be congruent with already established emergency response protocols and 
plans. In the local plans, establishment of community-based task forces and collaboration 
between local governmental agencies that support response is the basis for extending 
scarce resources and reducing duplication of effort. Public health now takes a lead role in 
either initiating the community planning process or participating actively in the process. 
In the review of the North Carolina public health response, local public health agencies 
have made great strides in accomplishing a high level of collaboration with interagency 
partnerships. However to continue to maximize results, a process needs to be in place to 
maintain those relationships and to establish effective communication avenues before, 
during and after an event. It is recommended that local public health agencies develop an 
electronic database of inter- and intra-agency contact information that has reminder flags 
to trigger review and updates on a regular basis.  
In addition, local public health agencies are encouraged to expand formal 
collaboration with adjacent jurisdictions. Sporadic drills and exercises are held across 
county lines but there are few formal processes to establish sharing of best practices that 
include determining effective approaches to planning and exercises, response models and 
resource sharing (Brogden, L. & Easterling, D. 2009). The PHRST network and local 
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health director forums allow for public health inter-jurisdictional meetings and sharing 
systems but seldom do other agency planning partners have an opportunity to collaborate 
collectively with local public health agencies across jurisdictions. Diverse organizations 
and agency partners would benefit through face-to-face networking when engaged in 
community planning. The logical entity to coordinate this process is the Public Health 
Regional Surveillance teams and with support from local public health agencies efforts 
can be made to create annual regional community response planning opportunities that 
include all agency partners, not limited those to public health and emergency 
management. 
Preparedness planning for public health emergencies also includes a framework to 
address isolation and quarantine as non pharmaceutical methods of controlling and 
containing pandemics. Because of the lessons learned from the 2003 SARS event in 
Toronto, it was clear that legal issues surrounding isolation and quarantine can hamper 
crisis response (Campbell, 2004). Since 2005, federal regulations have moved to fill legal 
gaps to support decision making at the time of a pandemic event. Guidance from the 
Congressional Research Service (Swendiman and Jones, 2009) indicates the issues 
surrounding isolation and quarantine, volunteer management, closure of public services 
and business, and worker compensation still need to be addressed but that case law has 
clarified some of the issues. In the North Carolina response to novel H1N1, state 
guidance for instituting isolation and quarantine was given to the local public health 
agencies. However gaps in the knowledge base of interagency partners, such as local law 
enforcement and local community leaders, could lead to enforcement issues in a 
pandemic outbreak.  In local public health response planning it is important that state and 
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local statutory provisions are reviewed locally with community authorities to assure the 
pandemic influenza plan has the legal support to implement needed control interventions 
in a crisis. To that end, local public health agencies need to provide ongoing regular 
training to their boards of health, county commissioners and law enforcement entities. 
This can be supported by the NC Association of Local Health Directors (NCALHD).  
State and local public health agencies utilize the tools of epidemiology to 
establish active and passive surveillance methods that allow for timely recognition of 
potential threats. Preparedness and response rely on monitoring patterns and analysis of 
those patterns to help put in place prevention activities or mitigate poor outcomes 
(Turnock, 2004). This allows local public health organizations to determine extent of 
disease within a community and to identify priority health problems in the affected 
community. In local public health agencies in North Carolina there is a need to improve 
training in the use of the existing passive surveillance system in place. While computer 
based surveillance tools exist that collect data from emergency departments and 
emergency responders, there is a need in local public health agencies to have trained staff 
to utilize these tools. In addition, regional trending has been neglected at the local level. 
Because of concerns with protected health information, the epidemiologist or 
communicable disease nurse in one county cannot view the numbers or locations of cases 
in an adjacent county so little data comparison and analysis is able to be done at the local 
health department level. The overburdened system capacity of local public health also 
contributes to a lack of time and resources for case investigation and analysis. It is 
recommended that a process be established to allow those responsible for local level 
surveillance to share information and collaborate on data analysis, review existing 
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research, and investigate cases to determine case definition, identity, source and modes of 
transmission and risk factors. These measures will reduce the burden of the local health 
departments by creating multicounty epidemiology/ surveillance positions with the intent 
that more effective control methods can be recommended from this information leading 
to better regional and local health outcomes. It would follow this could be expedited and 
coordinated through PHRST with a medical or nurse epidemiologist taking the lead. 
One of the primary roles of local public health planning is in preparing to make 
decisions on acquisition and distribution of antiviral drugs and vaccines (HHS, 2005). 
The HHS guidance holds the expectation that the plans made for pharmaceutical 
interventions will be jointly exercised across agencies and community partners to test 
response capabilities locally. While the plans currently in place were effective in 
responding to novel Influenza H1N1 and receiving the SNS, local public health agencies 
need to systematically review and modify those plans in light of inaccurate assumptions 
made about origin of the source of the virus. It is recommended that plans be adaptable to 
what is occurring with a realization the data may not be pure and the environment can 
change rapidly. Revised plans should be scalable with a process and a plan for 
progression. In order to meet the changing environment, plan revisions should have 
details on how information will be obtained, connections will be made and new partner or 
resources will be engaged (Casani, 2009). Recommendations would also include a 
focused intent to mesh the SNS and Pandemic Influenza plans to assure coordination and 
cohesion of planning and response. The burdens associated with developing preparedness 
plans could be lessened by providing local public health agencies with plan templates. 
However, it is recognized that templates are more appropriate for some health 
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departments than for others and there needs to be a commitment at the local level to 
invest the time to adapt the template to the local needs in consultation with community 
partners..  
Public health determines and recommends those preventive and treatment options 
that will reduce the burden to the community before, during and after an event. To be 
effective in that role, local public health agencies need to critically plan for decision 
making about public health measures that will reduce risk to the community. Most local 
agencies need to begin or fine tune plans with local health care providers and other 
community partners about the safest and most effective process and methods for 
delivering public health mitigation interventions. Those plans need to include a process 
for determining decisions based on the magnitude of the event. Training and plans for use 
of respiratory protection equipment need to be put in place. Decision making and 
partnering to plan distribution of medication and administration of vaccine to those at 
greatest risks needs to be reviewed and become more scalable. Previously written plans 
for mass distribution clinics at predetermined sites will not meet the needs in a localized 
or smaller event. This could be a role for the PHRST to provide training curricula, 
assessment, and planning model templates. 
Public health agencies have a significant role in health messaging to provide facts 
and data to the citizens. The lessons learned from SARS and Katrina clearly illustrates 
the public’s need to hear the extent of the risk from a trusted source. If the public 
understands the source of the health threat, the risks, and what they need to do to protect 
themselves, the response is much better and lives are saved because interventions are 
successful (North Carolina Institute for Public Health, 2003). In today’s information age, 
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the public expects to have that information immediately in a format that is fast and 
factual. Clear risk communication plans need to be developed and practiced at the local 
level. Templates for all levels of communication need to be in place delineating who at 
the local level is responsible for communicating with the staff, partners, local healthcare 
providers, and the public at large. Also included in that plan would be the process and 
method of communication with the various entities encouraging use of multiple 
electronic communication methods such as texting, e-mail, web based social networking, 
and hard devices such as radios, fax and phone communication. Training for those 
designated to be responsible to give public messages on behalf of the agency including 
how to coordinate those messages with the state, regional and other local agencies is 
needed. Little time has been spent in preparing for this role that is only visible on an as 
needed basis in most local public health agencies. Because this has not been a high 
priority need in most local public health agencies, it is appropriate for the NC DPH to 
provide guidance, consultation and training to the localities. Certainly it is the 
responsibility of the state to provide the locality with a consistent message map and 
health information resources appropriate to the event. 
In reviewing the recently completed North Carolina public health assessment 
(Brogden, L. & Easterling, D., 2009) and the local public health agencies after action 
reports, drills and meeting reports, respondents agreed there needed to be improved 
communication and coordination between NC PHP&R, local public health agencies, and 
PHRSTs. In North Carolina, preparedness and response is only one of many important 
functions and services provided by local public health agencies. To improve response to 
public health threats and increase local commitment, reduce preparedness planning 
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around low-probability, high-impact event such as a bioterrorist event. Instead use this 
real event to focus planning and preparedness on events more likely to occur. A more 
balanced relationship/partnership between NC DPH and local health departments would 
assist in each entity better serving the community. To that end, increase more face-to-face 
dialogue between local public health agencies, PHRST and DPH personnel to allow for a 
better understanding between all parties, and the opportunity to maximize resources and 
reduce duplication of efforts. 
Conclusion 
In the timeframe of April - May 2009, North Carolina public health system was 
challenged in a real time event that required making the right decisions in surveillance 
and response to a pandemic influenza threat. Plans were engaged that centered on 
determining assets, detailed the process of assessing and containing threats, and 
responding to those threats with an adequate, trained workforce that understood the 
relevant roles and responsibilities. The North Carolina system was successful in case 
finding, risk mitigation, and receiving and managing SNS assets. The public health 
infrastructure was healthy for this event but capacity needs still exist, and the plans in 
place need revision and modification to become scalable and flexible based on the event 
and resources available. Also clear is that the public and community partners expect 
immediate, factual information and clear guidance from trusted public health agencies, a 
role local public health has not always embraced and needs a clear plan to address. There 
is much effective in the public health system in North Carolina but whether in these 
challenging times the system can continue to make the changes needed to fill the 
identified gaps remains to be seen. 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 30 of 39 
References 
Balicer, R. D., Omer, S. B., Barnett, D. J., & Everly Jr., G. S. (2006). Local public health 
workers’ perceptions toward responding to an influenza pandemic. BMC Public 
Health 2006, 6:99. Retrieved August 9, 2009 from 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/99  
Berkowitz, B. (2002). Public health nursing practice: aftermath of September 11, 2001.  
Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 7 (3). Retrieved August 1, 2009 from 
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPerio
dicals/OJIN.aspx  
Brogden, L. & Easterling, D. (2009). At a Crossroads: North Carolina Public Health 
Preparedness 2009. Assessment prepared for the North Carolina Division of 
Public Health. Winston Salem, NC: Core Path Solutions, LLC. 
Campbell, A. (2004). The SARS Commission Interim Report: SARS and Public Health 
in Ontario Executive Summary. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice and Science, 2(2). Retrieved June 24, 2009 from: 
http://www.liebertonline.com/loi/bsp  
Casani, J. (September 24, 2009). Guidance for Revisions to Local Health Department 
Pandemic Flu Plans. Presentation by the NC Office of Public Health Planning & 
Response, webinar to the North Carolina local public health agencies. 
Casani, J, Matuszak, D. L., & Benjamin, G. C. (2001). Under Siege: One State's 
Perspective of the Anthrax Events of October/November 2001 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. (1): 43-
45. Retrieved September 6, 2009 from: http://www.liebertonline.com/loi/bsp  
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 31 of 39 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2009). CDC Recommendations for State 
and Local Planning for a 2009 Novel H1N1 Influenza Program. Released July 8, 
2009. Retrieved July 22, 2009 from 
http://www.sgh.org.sa/sf/files/CDC%20Recommendations_for_State_Local_Plan
ning.pdf  
Cheng, M. (2009, August 2). Despite safety concerns, Europe to rush testing of swine flu 
vaccine. The Virginia Pilot, Health & Science p.2. 
Chretien, J-P., Tomich, N. E., Gaydos, J. C. & Kelley, P. W. (2009). Real-time public 
health surveillance for emergency preparedness. American Journal of Public 
Health 99 (8), 1360-1363. 
Cinti, S. (2005). Pandemic influenza, are we ready? Journal of Disaster Management & 
Response 2005 3(3), 61- 67. 
Cox, N. J. & Subbarao, K. (2000). Global epidemiology of influenza: past and present. 
Annual Review of Medicine 2000 51, 407-421. 
Department of Health and Human Services. (2005). HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. 
Released November 2005. Washington, DC. Retrieved from August 22, 2009 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/  
Department of Health and Human Services. (2008). FY 2008 HHS Agency Financial 
Report. Date of Report: 11/17/2008; updated: 12/08/2008. Retrieved September 
26, 2009 from http://www.hhs.gov/afr/  
Federal Emergency Management Agency (March, 2009). Developing, Maintaining, State, 
Tribal, Territorial and Local Government Emergency Plans, a Comprehensive 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 32 of 39 
Preparedness Guide101. Retrieved October 10, 2009 from 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/cpg_101_layout.pdf  
Garrett, L. (2000). Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health. New York: 
Hyperion. 
Gensheimer, K. F., Meltzer, M. I., Postema, A. S. & Strikas, R. A. (2003). Influenza 
pandemic preparedness. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 9(12), 1645-1648. 
Goodman, R. A., Remington, P. L., Howard, R. J. (2000). Communicating Information 
for Action within the Public Health System.  In Teutsch, S. M. & Churchill, R. E. 
(Eds.), Principals and Practice of Public Health Surveillance (2
nd
 ed., 168-175). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Henderson, D. A., Courtney, B., Inglesby, T. V. Toner, E., & Nuzzo, J. B. (2009). Public 
health and medical response to the 1957-58 influenza pandemic. Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science, 7(3). Retrieved August 
19, 2009 from: 
http://www.liebertonline.com/loi/bsp  
Institute of Medicine Committee on Assuring the Health of the Public in the 21
st
 Century 
(2003). The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: 
The National Academies Press. 
Janes, G. R., Hutwagner, L. C., Cates Jr., W., Stroup, D. F. & Williamson, G. D. (2000). 
Descriptive Epidemiology: Analyzing and Interpreting Surveillance Data. In 
Teutsch, S. M. & Churchill, R. E. (Eds.), Principals and Practice of Public Health 
Surveillance (2
nd
 ed., 112-115). New York: Oxford University Press. 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 33 of 39 
Katz, R. (2009). Use of revised international health regulations during Influenza (H1N1) 
epidemic. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 15(8)1165-1170. 
Landesman, L. Y. (2005). Public Health Management of Disasters (2
nd
. ed.). Washington, 
DC: American Public Health Association. 
Luk, J., Gross, P., & Thompson, W.W. (2001, October 15). Observations on mortality 
during the 1918 influenza pandemic. Clinical Infectious Disease 2001 (33), 1375-
1378. 
Morens, D. M., Taubenberger, J. K., Folkers, G. K., & Fauci, A. S. (2009). An historical 
antecedent of modern guidelines for community pandemic mitigation. Public 
Health Reports, 124(1), 22-25. 
National Association of County and City Health Officials. (2009). 2008 National Profile 
of Local Health Departments. Washington, DC. Retrieved September 26, 2009 
from 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/infrastructure/profile/resources/2008reports/index.c
fm  
North Carolina Institute for Public Health. (October 23, 2003). “SARS: When a Global 
Outbreak Hits Home”. Public Health Grand Rounds. Retrieved October 8, 2009 
from http://www.publichealthgrandrounds.unc.edu/sars/index.htm  
North Carolina Office of Public Health Preparedness & Response [NC PHP&R]. (2009). 
After Action Report/ Corrective Action Plan Matrix for regional or local NC 
public health agencies. Not published material. 
Ransom, M.M. (2004). Community Public Health Legal Preparedness: Bridging the Gap 
between Public Health and Health Care Attorneys. The American Health Lawyers 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 34 of 39 
Association Health Lawyers News, 2 (7), (Online). Retrieved June 24, 2009 from 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/PHLP/prepinitiative.asp  
Reichert, T. A. (2005). Preparing for the next influenza pandemic: lessons from 
multinational data. The Pediatric Infectious Disease Journal 24 (11), SS228-
SS231. 
Rothstein, M. A (Ed.). (2003). Quarantine and Isolation: lessons Learned from SARS. A 
Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention November 2003. 
Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law, University of Louisville School of 
Medicine. Retrieved June 24, 2009 from: 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/quarantine.asp  
Smolinski, M.S., Hamburg, M. A., & Lederberg, J. (Eds.). (2005). Microbial Threats to 
Health: The Threat of Pandemic Influenza.” Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press. 
Swendiman, K. S. & Jones, N. L. (2009) The Influenza A (H1N1) Outbreak: Selected 
Legal Issues (Congressional Research Service Publication report R40560). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 
Thacker, S. B. (2000). Historical Development. In Teutsch, S. M. & Churchill, R. E. 
(Eds.), Principals and Practice of Public Health Surveillance (2
nd
 ed., 1-15). New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Turnock, B. J. (2004). Public Health: What It Is and How It Works (3
rd
 ed.). Boston: 
Jones and Bartlett Publishers. 
Webby, R. J. & Webster, R. G. (2003, November 28). Are we ready for pandemic 
influenza? Science, 302 (11) 1519-1522. 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 35 of 39 
Whyne, D. M. & Pass, P. A. (2007). Pandemic Influenza: a call to action. John Hopkins 
Advanced Studies in Nursing 5(2) 38- 61. 
World Health Organization Writing Group. (2006). Nonpharmaceutical interventions for 
pandemic influenza, National and Community Measures. Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 12(1), 88-94. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Review of North Carolina Public Health Response to Novel Influenza A (H1N1)
 Page 36 of 39 
Appendix A 
Table 1: Review of 41 NC Local Public Health Agencies  
Public Health 
Responsibility 
Strengths Areas of Improvement 
Enhancing disease 
surveillance: 
 Case finding 
 Case investigation 
 Monitoring trends in 
local community 
 Specimen collection 
and submission 
 The NC HAN, health alert network 
was successful in apprising the 
localities of emerging issues 
 The NC DETECT passive syndromic 
surveillance system was helpful  
 NC EDSS state wide communicable 
disease database was successful in 
providing a documented record of 
cases identified and allowed for 
trending of cases  
 Weekly updates by the state office of 
Epidemiology and laboratory 
surveillance  
 LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH 
AGENCY instituted case finding by 
daily calls to local health care 
providers, school health nurses, and 
local pharmacists reinforcing 
collaboration with local partners 
 Eight local public health agencies did 
not have strong school system 
infrastructure to track illness and 
absenteeism in the schools 
 Three local public health agencies 
noted a need to improve and enhance 
communication with pharmacies and 
local pharmacists  
 One local public health agency 
identified a need to provide 
epidemiological surveillance and 
case investigation training for staff to 
improve ability to respond 
 A need for more local staff trained in 
the use of NC DETECT and NC 
EDSS with more support for training 
from the state 
 Identified a need to improve 
communication with the local 
emergency department and 
laboratories in terms of specimen 
collection, processing and testing 
Receiving and distributing 
public stocks of antiviral 
drugs and vaccines (SNS)  
 Identify local 
receiving sites (LRS) 
 Collaborate with local 
emergency 
management agencies 
(EMA) and law 
enforcement (LLE) for 
safety, security and 
distribution 
 Establish a process for 
receipt and 
distribution 
 
 The SNS plan overall was workable 
and provided the process to 
accomplish the goal. Eight Local 
public health agencies indicated the 
event response was successful 
 Inter and intra agency 
communication were identified as 
being an overall strength, those 
collaborative relationships were in 
place when needed allowing for local 
flexibility to get the job done 
 Interesting to note, two Local public 
health agencies indicated a strength 
as the ability to get the mission 
accomplished through collaboration 
outside of written policies and 
lengthy standard operating 
procedures utilizing common sense 
through the established interagency 
collaboration 
 Successful safety and security plans 
with the cooperation of local law 
enforcement (LLE) 
 Eight local public health agencies 
identified a need for improved 
communication and clarity in the 
receipt process from NC PHR&P. 
One local public health agency stated 
the state NC PHP& R needs a QA 
plan for communication  
 Process and resources needs 
included: 
o An inventory database with 
consistent naming of 
products. It was confusing 
when order documents did 
not match naming on 
packaging or common 
names. 
o Improvements to 
documentation particularly 
chain of custody 
o Alternative LRS sites that 
are adaptable for smaller or 
larger shipments. Updates 
for LRS agreements with 
local facility partners 
(schools, local government, 
etc.) 
o Long term storage needs. 
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Public Health 
Responsibility 
Strengths Areas of Improvement 
The plan was made to 
receive and dispense, but 
this event required receipt 
and storage. 
o Equipment for off loading 
and distribution 
o Deeper list of back up 
personnel in all roles 
o Need for standing orders 
template to dispense 
antiviral or vaccines. Adapt 
to local pharmacy 
agreements. 
o Training needs for  local 
partners-EMA and LLE 
o Improved call down lists 
and more methods of 
reaching partners and staff 
o LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH 
AGENCY staff training  
needs in the SNS plan and 
ICS identified 
o SNS items were not a good 
mix for the event 
 Plan issues identified; 
o SNS plan needs to reference 
pandemic influenza plan 
o Plan needs to be modified to 
include smaller events and 
non mass distribution events  
 One LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH 
AGENCY comment: “receiving 
unrequested, unnecessary, and 
unused SNS assets still baffles me as 
it sits in gathering cobwebs in a 
storage closet”. 
Providing local health 
providers guidance on 
clinical management and 
infection control  
 
 Most local public health agencies had 
established relationships in place 
with local health care providers 
 Communication methods and contact 
lists were in place in many local 
public health agencies including the 
use of blast fax, 24/7 call lines, and 
web page posting. Many Local public 
health agencies made personal calls 
to the local healthcare providers to 
share information 
 Local public health agencies had 
local hospital representatives as 
members of the response partnership 
 NC PHP&R encourage partners to 
attend weekly briefings and sent 
 Information was overwhelming, an 
abundance of information that 
changed rapidly leaving little time to 
develop a process to disseminate 
effectively. Difficult to manage 
messages 
 Clearly delineated clinical guidance 
was delayed in coming from the state 
 One local public health agency 
recommended the state provide 
guidance package to go with SNS 
that is dispersed to local health care 
providers 
 Technology for state weekly 
briefings was not reliable 
 Process and resources needs 
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Public Health 
Responsibility 
Strengths Areas of Improvement 
information to provider networks. 
Provided up dated laboratory and 
clinical guidance at weekly 
teleconferences 
included: 
o A need to strengthen 
established ties and to add 
other agencies to the list 
o Three Local public health 
agencies indicated a need to 
develop a list serv to reach 
providers 
o Other suggestions to 
improve communication 
included web page access 
and utilizing the medical 
society 
Preventing local disease 
transmission using a range 
of containment strategies 
 
 Isolation and quarantine (I&Q) 
decision was made at the State level 
reducing stress on the locality. 
Templates were provided 
 Local public health agencies 
understood their role 
 Regional Public Health response 
Teams have developed sub 
committee to better define roles and 
to provide tools to localities 
 SNS included respiratory protection 
equipment  
 Eight local public health agencies 
identified a need for training and 
better understanding of isolation and 
quarantine by local law enforcement 
 Seven Local public health agencies 
identified a need for a form template 
to be used by those under isolation in 
order to document event for their 
employment or school. 
 A need for I&Q templates to be in 
standardized and in multiple 
languages 
 A need for school systems to develop 
a policy or process for school 
closures 
 Training needs identified for local 
schools and health care facilities for 
custodial and cleaning staff 
 Seven Local public health agencies 
found that local healthcare providers 
and emergency services providers did 
not have a respiratory protection plan 
in place and no documentation of fit 
testing those that may need respirator 
protection support 
 Two found a need to have 
maintenance performed on their 
isolation, reverse airflow rooms 
Providing ongoing 
communication with the 
public 
 
 Local public health agencies had 
media outlets identified pre-event, 
contacts were in place 
 State provided messages in English 
and Spanish 
 Liberal use of technology to disperse 
message including fax, web based, 
phone reverse 911 
 There was a recognized concern that 
consistent messages and useful 
templates were slowed from the 
State, the local public health agencies 
could not wait for the state to provide 
template and message mapping 
 Four local public health agencies 
identified a need to have better 
coordination of their local 
information, creation of a joint 
information command 
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 Three specifically identified a need 
for a risk communication plan 
 Need for PIO training for local staff 
 More interpreters were needed and 
good sources of multi language 
materials. Increase ways of reaching 
limited English speaking community 
members 
 Ways to improve message delivery 
included establishing 24 hour hot line 
capability, better use of child care 
networks, faith based community 
sources 
Infrastructure and 
organizational framework 
of Local public health 
agencies 
 Overall the plans both the SNS 
and the Pandemic Influenza 
Plans were effective in helping 
Local public health agencies 
respond to the novel H1N1 
pandemic event 
 Cases were identified, SNS 
received, control measures put in 
place, information was readily 
available 
 Three local public health agencies 
indicated that staff resources were 
tested by the event, a need to balance 
ongoing LHD duties/ clinics and the 
need to respond to the pandemic. 
Most of the local public health 
agencies were concerned about 
staffing and resource availability. 
 Training of staff was identified. 
Training in ICS, epidemiology 
principles, respiratory protection, and 
just in time training for the event 
 Policy needs to indicate 
consequences of not being available 
to work during a preparedness 
emergency  
 Resources from the region and state 
should be evaluated early and placed 
in the locations they can be most 
effective rather than shotgun fashion 
of provision 
 Infrastructure needs identified was 
better radio communication within 
local public health agency and 
working with partner agencies 
 Influenza plan gaps identified 
including a need to included isolation 
& quarantine guidance, decision 
making process for rationing 
pharmaceuticals, cohesion between 
the SNS and Pandemic influenza 
plans, trigger events were based on 
the WHO model which was not 
appropriate for this event  
 
